Data Security and Data Breach Notification for Financial Institutions by Honeywill, Sean C.
NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 10 | Issue 1 Article 14
2006
Data Security and Data Breach Notification for
Financial Institutions
Sean C. Honeywill
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sean C. Honeywill, Data Security and Data Breach Notification for Financial Institutions, 10 N.C. Banking Inst. 269 (2006).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol10/iss1/14
Data Security and Data Breach Notification for Financial
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I. INTRODUCTION
With more than 45 million customer accounts compromised in
less than eight months, the year of 2005 may come to be known as the
year of the data breach.1  Data losses at well known financial
institutions, such as Bank of America, Citigroup, and Wachovia, as well
as at data broker companies and third-party service providers, have
caused the media, consumers, and the government alike to hone in on
data protection measures. The year started with ChoicePoint, a
company that compiles consumer data for resale, reporting that thieves
posing as legitimate customers had purchased the addresses, social
security numbers, and credit reports of around 145,000 consumers.3
Bank of America then reported losing backup tapes containing the
personal account information of 1.2 million federal employees.4 Next,
DSW Shoe Warehouse reported that hackers stole credit and debit card,
checking account, and driver's license numbers from a database for 108
of the chain's 175 stores, affecting 1.4 million customers.5
Various entities, ranging from LexisNexis, Ameritrade, Time
Warner, and MCI reported data compromises next.6 In May, Bank of
1. See, e.g., Michael Dumiak, Absent the Fort Knox Effect, FIN. IT SECURrrY, Sept.
2005, at 22. For a list of data breaches in 2005, see A Chronology of Data Breaches Since
the ChoicePoint Incident, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/
ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2006) (summarizing data breaches
beginning with the ChoicePoint incident in Feb. 2005).
2. Dumiak, supra note 1, at 23.
3. Id.
4. Id. Ironically, one of the consumers whose personal information was lost when
Bank of America's backup tapes disappeared was Pat Leahy, Democrat-Vermont, a
congressman who is leading the debate on whether more regulation of data brokers is
needed and whose name is on a proposed breach notification bill. See Michael Sisk, It Fell
offthe Truck, FIN. IT SECURITY, Sept. 2005, at 12.
5. Steven Gray, DSW Shoe Says Theft of Data Involved 1.4 Million Credit Cards,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2005, at B8.
6. Without a Trace, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, June 17, 2005 (subscription required; on file
with author).
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America and Wachovia reported that former employees had allegedly
sold the data of 108,000 former and current customers to a third-party
who then sold the information to collection agencies.7 Citigroup then
joined the data breach disclosure party in June when it reported that
United Parcel Service had lost computer data tapes on 3.9 million
customers while in transit to a credit bureau.8 Two weeks later,
Mastercard International topped everyone, disclosing that the credit card
data of 40 million consumers had been compromised by an unidentified
hacker at third-party credit processor CardSystems, which moves
information for Visa, Mastercard, and American Express. 9
The consequences of the misuse of such confidential customer
information on consumers and the public are numerous - financial and
criminal identity theft, family stress, public embarrassment, terrorism,
and even murder.1 ° In 2004 alone, 9.3 million Americans were the
victims of identity theft." And in terms of monetary harm, identity
theft annually costs consumers $5 billion, and businesses and financial
institutions $48 billion."a While the accidental loss of computer backup
tapes was the major source of compromised data disclosures for
financial institutions, the spill-over effect caused by the uproar from
breaches at data brokers and third-parties is being felt by the financial
industry, both in compliance costs and reputation damage. 3
7. Id.
8. See Mitchell Pacelle, UPS Loses Citigroup Customer Data, WALL ST. J., June 7,
2005, at A3.
9. Dumiak, supra note 1, at 23.
10. See Oversight Hearing on Data Security, Data Breach Notices, Privacy & Identity
Theft Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 5 (2005)
[hereinafter Testimony of Consumer & Privacy Groups] (testimony of Consumer and
Privacy Groups on Security Breaches and Privacy), available at http://www.
Consumersunion.org/pdf/IDTheft-TestO9o5.pdf. In one case, a man purchased a woman's
work address online and then tracked her down and killed her. See Hearing on Identity
Theft & Data Broker Services Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, &
Transportation, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of Mar J. Frank, Esq.), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfmn?id= 1491 &witid=4254; see also
IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, IDENTITY THEFT: THE AFTERMATH 2004 (2005),
available at http://www.idtheftcenter.org/aftermath2004.pdf (studying the impact of identity
theft on victims).
11. Bob Sullivan, Study: 9.3 Million ID Theft Victims Last Year, MSNBC, Jan. 26,
2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6866768/.
12. FED. TRADE COMM'N, IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 7 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/O9/synovatereport.pdf
13. See, e.g., Dionne Searcey, In 2003, California Passed its Security Breach Notice
Law. Its Effect has Extended Well Beyond the State., WALL ST. J., July 18, 2005, at R6.
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An issue that came to the forefront in 2005 is that data brokers,'
4
companies that collect personal information from public and private
records and then sell the information to both government and private
entities, fall outside the scope of most current federal privacy
regulations, including the Fair Credit Reporting Act' 5  (FCRA)
(applicable to consumer reporting agencies) and the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act 16 (GLBA) (applicable to financial institutions).17 And while
some business entities had a legal duty to safeguard customer data, such
as financial institutions under the GLBA, none had a legal duty to
disclose data security breaches to consumers whose information may
have been affected unless a state law mandated such. 8 Over twenty-one
state legislatures passed data breach disclosure notification laws in 2005
as a response, causing a patchwork regulatory environment with which
financial institutions, along with third-parties and data brokers, must
comply. 9
In Part II, this note explores the newfound focus on security
measures being taken by financial institutions, and considers possible
further innovations.2° Part III concentrates on current federal and state
14. For a discussion of the data broker industry, see NATHAN BROOKS, DATA BROKERS:
BACKGROUND & INDUSTRY OVERVIEW (2005), available at http://www.opencrs.com/rpts/
RS2213720050505.pdf. See also Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model
Regime of Privacy Protection (Version 2.0), (Geo. Wash. U. Law School Pub. Law
Research Paper No. 132, 2005; Geo. Wash. U. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 132,
2005), at 5-10, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=699701.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). The FCRA defines a "consumer reporting agency" as an
entity that regularly engages in "assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or
other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third
parties." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a. It is possible, therefore, for a data broker to be subject to the
requirements of the FCRA, but only to the extent they are providing "consumer reports."
See Hearing on Protecting Consumers' Data: Policy Issues Raised by ChoicePoint Before
the Subcomm. On Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 109th Cong. 7-8 (2005) [hereinafter FTC ChoicePoint Testimony]
(statement of the Fed. Trade Comm'n), available at http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/
pdf/ftc_03.15.05.pdf. For an overview of the FCRA and its application to data brokers, see
id. at 6-10.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (2000). To the extent that data brokers fall within the
definition of "financial institutions" under the GLBA, they would be subject to the Act.
FTC ChoicePoint Testimony, supra note 15, at 11; see also discussion infra Part III.A and
accompanying notes.
17. House & Senate Hold Hearings on Identity Theft & Data Protection Legislation,
PRIVACY LAW ALERT (Collier Shannon Scott, PLLC, Wash., D.C.), May 12, 2005, at 1,
available at http://www.colliershannon.com/documents/IdentityTheftHearing.pdf.
18. See, e.g., Searcey, supra note 13; see also discussion infra Part III.
19. See, e.g., Searcey, supra note 13.
20. See infra notes 24-106 and accompanying text.
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data security and breach disclosure legislation, as well as regulatory
guidance affecting financial institutions.2 Part IV examines possible
aspects of a new federal data breach disclosure law, and the arguments
for and against such features.22 Part V concludes, summarizing the best
case scenario for financial institutions regarding federal intervention in
the data breach disclosure arena.23
II. THE BANKING INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO DATA BREACHES
Securing customers' data is not a one time problem with a single
solution.24 Because today's technology will be obsolete tomorrow, any
security program must be flexible enough to adapt to change.25 And
while technical data protection methods have come to the forefront of
discussions, other more traditional areas of security cannot be ignored.26
This section examines three key components of data security in the
current banking environment - information technology (IT), human
resources, and consumer education.
A. Emerging Importance of Information Technology
Bank executives cannot ignore the IT department. 7 Media
coverage of security mishaps harms a bank's brand image, which in turn
21. See infra notes 107-66 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 167-252 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 253-68 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Daniel Wolfe, Wanted: Ways to Protect Online Data After the Login, AM.
BANKER, July 26, 2005, at 5A, available at 2005 WLNR 12091327.
25. The Federal Trade Commission has noted that "security is more a process than a
state." See FED. TRADE COMM'N ADVISORY COMM., FINAL REPORT OF THE FTC ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON ONLINE ACCESS AND SECURITY 19 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
acoas/papers/acoasfinal 1.pdf.
26. See Susan Marks, Data Security is an HR and an IT Issue, AM. BANKER, Aug. 19,
2005, at 10, available at 2005 WLNR 13389233.
27. See Michael Grebb, Changing of the Guard, U.S. BANKER, July 1, 2005, at 40,
available at 2005 WLNR 10363425. Financial institutions are hesitant to discuss what they
do to monitor compromised accounts, likely to prevent giving people interested in
committing fraud more information with which to work. See Robin Sidel & Mitchell
Pacelle, Credit-Card Breach Tests Banking Industry's Defenses, WALL ST. J., June 21,
2005, at Cl. However, this strategy can backfire because consumers feel more secure the
more they know about how their personal information is being protected. Id.
272 [Vol. 10
lowers consumer confidence and use of the bank's products.2
8 Before
the days of data breach notification legislation, most banks would have
a projected budget for financial loss due to breaches, and as long as that
budget number was not exceeded, protecting data was not an issue.
29
But now, with the possibility of major harm to reputation, customer
trust levels, and stock prices, executives take IT seriously.
30
Financial institutions today focus much more on data security
than in the past when data protection was handled solely by the IT
department.' Now, it is not uncommon for executives from multiple
areas to come together to discuss IT issues and how to better protect
data.32 As a result, the IT department is receiving more respect and a
bigger budget.33 For example, Wachovia has formed a Security and
Identity Protection Committee, which includes executives from a cross-
section of Wachovia's lines of business.34 Another element of this
greater focus on IT is that security vendors deal with higher-level
executives rather than just those in the IT department.35  By
acknowledging that data security is an integral aspect of the whole
financial institution, banks are taking a much needed step to better
36
protect customer information.
In terms of the actual technology being used, firewall software
works hand in hand with the customer authentication process, and is
standard security for a bank's online systems.37 A firewall blocks
unauthorized interactive access with a bank's network from individuals
28. See, e.g., Press Release, Elec. Data Sys. Corp., Consumers Insist Financial
Institutions Remain Vigilant In Protecting Their Privacy (Sept. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.eds.com/news/news.aspx?news-id=2596 (indicating that thirty percent of
consumers would close all accounts and move to another financial institution if their
personal information was compromised).
29. Jeffrey Rothfeder, Pressure Increases, But CIO's Still Struggle to Stop Identity
Theft, CIO INSIGHT, Sept. 9, 2005, http://www.cioinsight.com/article2/0,1540,1855955,0
0.asp.
30. See Grebb, supra note 27.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Putting money into IT security can more than pay for itself in the money saved
from fraud losses. See John Engen, Intelligence Turned Inward, FIN. IT SECURITY, Sept.
2005, at 18.
34. See Grebb, supra note 27.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Michael Sisk, Fixes on the Fly, FIN. IT SECURITY, Sept. 2005, at 28.
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or other networks.38 To get beyond a firewall, one must provide some
type of access right, which typically consists of the usemame and
password combination.39 Securing customer access rights is critical due
to the fact that phishing, pharming, malware, and other compromise
techniques are becoming prevalent in the financial industry.40 This
raises serious concerns because hackers in turn use such information to
gain access to customers' online accounts, which contain more sensitive
data and can thus perpetrate greater fraud.4'
In October 2005, U.S. regulators ordered banks to improve
security measures to reliably authenticate customers accessing internet
services, giving them until the end of 2006 to implement such
methods. 42 The "Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council -
an umbrella group of [federal banking] regulators - said that the use of
single-factor authentication, such as user name and password, [is]
inadequate for safeguarding against account fraud and identity theft ...
[and] banks should [instead rely on] dual-factor authentication., 43 Dual
authentication allows the user to be sure that the website is legitimate
and not set up as part of a scam, and permits the bank to authenticate the
customer's identity.44
38. See Wolfe, supra note 24. For a layman's description of a firewall, see
http://www.nrsttennessee.com/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Potpourri.ViewContent&ltem=nlin
eSecurity (last visited Jan. 12, 2006) (likening the firewall access process to that of a safety
deposit box).
39. See Wolfe, supra note 24.
40. See FED. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, AUTHENTICATION IN AN
INTERNET BANKING ENVIRONMENT 4 (2005), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/
pdf/authentication-guidance.pdf. Pharming is similar in nature to e-mail phishing, and
seeks to obtain personal information by directing users to fake web sites where theirinformation is then gathered on legitimate looking forms for the purpose of committing
fraud. Id. at n.7. Malware is short for malicious software, such as software designed to
capture and forward private information such as ID's, passwords, account numbers, and
access codes. Id. at n.8. See generally AARON EMIGH, IDENTITY THEFT TECH. COUNCIL,
ONLINE IDENTITY THEFT: PHISHING TECHNOLOGY, CHOKEPOINTS AND COUNTERMEASURES
(2005), available at http://www.antiphishing.org/Phishing-dhs-report.pdf (detailing the
technologies being used by online identity thieves and the possible tools that can be used to
reduce financial losses from such attacks).
41. See FED. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, supra note 40.
42. Id.; see also Steven Marlin, Feds Order Banks to Strengthen Online Authentication,
BANK SYSTEMS & TECH. ONLINE, Oct. 18, 2005, http://www.banktech.com/
showArticle.jhtmljsessionid=JNYKCGMTXSELYQSNDBECKHSCJUMEKJVN?articleI
D=172302371.
43. Marlin, supra note 42.
44. See, e.g., id.
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As the name suggests, dual factor authentication adds a second
security method, usually something the account user has in his/her
possession, to the standard practice of requiring a username and
password to log into a secure website.45 The additional layer of security
typically takes the form of a security token, a device that can attach to a
key chain and displays different numerical digits every minute.
46
"Users simply [add] the number [to] the end of their [login] passwords
when signing in to their accounts to gain access. The device foils
perpetrators who manage to steal passwords and IDs because the sign-in
process cannot be completed without the numbers generated by the
security token.,
47
Bank of America was the first large financial institution to adopt
such technology in May 2005 with SiteKey.48 Uniquely, SiteKey
provides two factor authentication without requiring the customer to
carry any kind of security token by instead using the customer's
personal computer (PC) as the second-factor hardware device.49
SiteKey requires customers to "pick an image, write a brief phrase, and
select three challenging questions."50 The customer and the bank can
then pass this information back and forth to confirm each other's
identity.5 If the customer attempts to login from another PC, the
system will seek answers to the three challenging questions before
45. Press Release, PassMark Security, PassMark Delivers the Internet's First Two-
Factor, No Hardware Authentication System (Feb. 3, 2005), available at
http://news.thomasnet.com/fullstory/ 4 6027 3 .
46. Jim Middlemiss, CIO Challenge: Two-Factor Authentication, WALL ST. & TECH.,
Apr. 27, 2005, http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD= 161
6 0 0 9 15.
47. Id.
48. Press Release, Bank Of Am., Bank of America Announces Industry-Leading
Security Feature for its 13.2 Million Online Banking Customers to Help Prevent Fraud and
Identity Theft (May 26, 2005), available at http://www.bankofamerica.com/newsroom/press
lpress.cfmr?PresslD=press.200505 26 .03 .htm. Stanford Federal Credit Union of Palo Alto,
Cal., was the first to utilize the SiteKey technology. See Wolfe, supra note 24.
49. Press Release, PassMark Security, supra note 45.
50. Press Release, Bank Of Am., supra note 48.
51. Id. The SiteKey approach still relies on the storage of each customer's unique
identifier on the merchant's database. See Trevor Zion Bauknight, PassMark's SiteKey -
Answering the Wrong Question, CAFE ID, http://www.cafeid.com/art-sitekey.shtml (last
visited Jan. 12, 2006). Compromise of this data would leave the consumer just as vulnerable
as they would be if their username and password were obtained. Id. Further, even though
the PassMark system is better at securing customer information than the login/password
authentication scheme, it is still possible that a consumer could lose or reveal their "secret
question" answers to a hacker. Id.
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allowing access to the online account.5 2 In October 2005, Wachovia
announced plans to pilot a similar dual certification system, with the
hope of launching the service for its 3 million online customers in
2006.53
Taking dual certification technology one step further, SiteKey
developer PassMark Security Inc. has developed a new system that will
monitor customers after they have passed the login test, and alert the
bank if suspicious activity occurs after login.54 The technology also
allows banks to monitor their employees' habits by checking for
changes in network settings and tracking if any employee is abusing
his/her data access rights. 55 This type of technology not only lessens the
possible harm if a security breach occurs by allowing the bank to
discover the breach faster, but also helps banks create audit trails in real
time, alleviating bank employees from having to dig through logs and
manually perform such tasks.56 The emergence of such software
reflects the financial industry's concern that hackers that steal
52. Lindsay Clarke, Bank of America to Use Two-Factor System to Beat Phishers,COMPUTER WKLY., May 27, 2005, http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2005/05/27/
2101 96 /BankofAmericatousetwo-factorsystemtobeatphishers.htm.
53. Will Boye, Wachovia to Pilot Test Online Security Feature, CHARLOTTE Bus. J.,Sept. 30, 2005, http://www.bizjoumals.com/charlotte/stories/2005/l0/03/newscolumn3.
html?fromrss=l. While the dual authentication systems are currently the leading standardin the industry, a three factor system would be even safer. See Wolfe, supra note 24.
However, a three factor system would require a finger scan or iris scan, something that mosthome computers currently do not have the capability to read. Id. For a more in depthdiscussion of fingerprint and eye scanning technology and banks, see James Hannah,Privacy Concerns, Expense Keep Biometrics Out of U.S. ATMs, Oct. 13, 2005,http://www.securityinfowatch.com/online/Financial/Privacy-Concems-Expense-Keep_
Biometrics-Out-of-U.S.-ATMs/5933SIW339.
54. See Wolfe, supra note 24.
55. Daniel Wolfe, War on Fraud Focusing on the Insider Front, AM. BANKER, Mar. 31,
2005, at 17, available at 2005 WLNR 5379835; see also discussion infra Part II.B.
56. See Sisk, supra note 37, at 29. First Citizens Bank, based in Raleigh, NC., usesCovelight Solutions' Percept for its online business banking application to help identify
suspicious activity. Id. Software maker Corillian Corp. launched its IntelligentAuthentication package on October 25, 2005, which tracks the behavior of online-banking
customers and builds histories of their habits, such as the computers the customer uses and
the normal time of day and geographic location from which the customer logs in from. RivaRichmond, Banks Seek Better Online-Security Tools, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2005, at B4.
"Corillian ... has sold the technology to three credit unions and says it is in talks with three
of the top-ten U.S. banks." Id. On November 8, 2005, software maker Entrust Inc. unveiled
a new version of its IdentityGuard product that offers a menu of user-verification methods
banks can choose to secure transactions they deem risky, which Miami-based
Commercebank NA employs. Id.
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consumers' account information could hurt online banking, which is
valued by banks as a low cost way of doing business. 7
Another method to increase online security involves encrypting
as much as possible behind firewalls5  Encryption software
"automatically encodes and decodes... information [marked sensitive
and confidential on financial institutions' servers and databases] as it
moves among different PCs on the network, thus rendering the files
unreadable to hackers."5 9 For example, when a customer types in a
username and password on a bank's online banking webpage, that
information will be encrypted before being sent over the internet to the
bank's network.6 °  While using encryption technology on
communications between a customer's PC and the bank is standard
practice in the industry, encrypting all information is not, because while
encryption itself is easy, the keys to read the data can be very difficult to
manage.6
Recent data breaches have exposed this point and turned the
focus of encryption efforts to another area of stored customer data.62
Most companies copy computer data onto backup tapes for storage with
third-party vendors in the event of a disaster.63 However, only six
percent of financial service companies encrypt all backup tapes,
primarily due to the high cost and technical difficulties of doing SO. 64
But with many of the reported data breaches involving lost unencrypted
57. Richmond, supra note 56.
58. Matthew de Paula, California Law Holds Firms Responsible for Breaches, U.S.
BANKER, Apr. 1, 2005, at 11, available at 2005 WLNR 5104784.
59. Jeffrey Rothfeder, Recipe for Foolproof Encryption, CIO INSIGHTS, Sept. 5, 2005,
http://www.cioinsight.com/article2/0,1540,1855963,00.asp. The top three U.S. credit
reporting companies recently announced they would adopt a single encryption standard to
better protect the huge amounts of sensitive electronic data they receive everyday from data
furnishers, including banks. Credit Reference Agencies Agree on Encryption Standard,
CARDLINE, Oct. 7, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 16292028. This shows how important
protecting customer data has become in light of security breaches, as the three companies
are traditionally rivals competing for business. James B. Kelleher, Credit Cos to Adopt One
Data Protection Standard, REUTERS, Sept. 22, 2005, http://fmdarticles.com/p/articles/
mi-zdpcm/is_200509/ai_n15614818.
60. See Rothfeder, supra note 59.
61. See Sisk, supra note 37, at 29. Burt Kaliski, vice president of research and chief
scientist at RSA Laboratories, predicts that within ten years, all sensitive data will be
encrypted as managing data becomes easier due to technology advances. Id.
62. See, e.g., Jon Swartz, Data Losses Push Businesses to Encrypt Backup Tapes, USA
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backup tapes, financial institutions are taking the necessary measures to
prevent similar occurrences in the future. 65  Bank of America and
Citigroup, for instance, are eliminating backup tapes where possible and
transitioning to computer-to-computer data transfers.66 They are also
testing encryption for any backup tapes that will still be used.67
B. Human Component of Data Security
All available security and encryption efforts do little good if
employees with the encryption codes or with daily access to customer
personal information are careless, or worse yet, commit fraudulent or
criminal activities.68 Thus, human resources are just as critical a part of
the data security solution as technical resources.69 In fact, insiders -
employees, third-parties under contract, and others - are the major
source of fraud-related losses for banks.70  The number of thefts by
insiders has risen in recent years, with the incurring ease that
technology provides for moving information.71 Insiders are involved in
an estimated seventy percent of security incidents,72 which result in
average damages when committed against a large company of $2.7
million, compared to only $57,000 in average damages when an
outsider commits the breach. 73  For example, in New Jersey, branch
managers and other employees at Bank of America, Wachovia, and
65. Id. Encryption of customer information can add another benefit for financial
institutions - if encrypted data is stolen, the institution is not required to report it under
California's breach notification act and many of the other state breach notification laws, thus
leading to speculation that Bank of America's lost backup tapes were in fact not encrypted.
See, e.g., Clint Boulton, Bank Data Leak Jump-Starts Encryption Talk, INTERNET NEWS,
Mar. 2, 2005, www.internetnews.com/ent-news/article.php/3486786.
66. See Isabelle Lindenmayer, Amro Unit: Loan Data Tapes Lost, AM. BANKER, Dec.
19, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 20863883.
67. Id.
68. See Michele Heller, Competing Data Security Bills Near Introduction, AM.
BANKER, June 9, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 9505863.
69. See Marks, supra note 26.
70. See Holly Sraeel, Want to Make a CEO Wince? Talk About Fraud, US BANKER,
July 2005, at 8, available at 2005 WLNR 10363407.
71. Wolfe, supra note 55. Additionally, there is more demand for consumer
information today on the black market, making it easier to profit from such acts than in the
past when one had to have their own methods for using the stolen data in place. Isabelle
Lindenmayer, FBI Report Underscores Insider Data-Theft, AM. BANKER, Nov. 29, 2005, at
10, available at 2005 WLNR 19563075.




Commerce Bank were alleged to have assisted an outsider in stealing
private information from 500,000 customer bank accounts, selling it to
bill collectors for a reported profit for the insiders of $10 per affected
account.74
Even honest employees with the best of intentions can severely
hurt a bank. 5 One study found that ninety-five percent of all data loss
incidents were unintentional and usually the result of careless or
untrained employees.76 Thus, simple security measures such as proper
training can be especially important for employees who might not
otherwise understand the risks stemming from certain actions.77
Additionally, many bank employees must handle customer information
in the normal course of business.78 To lessen the risk of misuse of data
in these normal situations, banks are required to conduct background
checks on all employees who will have access to customers' personal
information, and are prohibited by federal law from employing persons
who have been convicted of certain crimes.7 9
To further protect data, financial institutions are also setting up
stricter access protocols to limit the ability of employees and outsiders
from obtaining sensitive customer information.8 ° E*Trade Financial,
for example, is setting up protocols "to heavily restrict what customer
data is available to customer-service representatives."'" Along the same
lines, some banks are establishing protocols to make customer
74. Tom Costello, Massive Bank Security Breach Uncovered in N.J., MSNBC, Apr. 28,
2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7670774.
75. See VONTU, INC., DATA SECURITY TRENDS 2004, at 2 (2004), available at
http://www.vontu.com/uploadedFiles/global/VontuDataSecurityTrends2004.pdf.
76. Id. The human resource component includes destroying confidential information
properly. See Todd Davenport, Breaches, Credibility, and Agencies. With Data Security
'the New BSA, 'Banks Need to Adapt, AM. BANKER, July 28, 2005, at 1, available at 2005
WLNR 12220143. For example, a customer found intact loan files in a dumpster outside a
First Horizon Home Loan office in Fairfax, VA., which employees should have shredded.
Id. In April 2005, Wells Fargo alerted a small number of customers that their personal
information may have gone astray "due to an envelope stuffing error." See David Lazarus,
Wells Fargo's Snafu in Stuffing Envelopes, S.F. CHRON., May 8, 2005, at El, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/05/08/BUGP7CKKEB I .DTL&feed
=rss.business; see also infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
77. See Grebb, supra note 27.
78. See, e.g., Kelly Shermach, Technology Can't Fix Trust Breach, CRM BUYER, June
6, 2005, http://www.crmbuyer.com/story/43721 .html.
79. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 30 App. B, pt. III.C.l.e (2005); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (2000).
80. See Grebb, supra note 27.
81. Id.
2006]
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information less usable (and thus less valuable), such as a recent
Wachovia initiative to end the use of social security numbers for
customer authentication. 82 Such measures have the additional benefit of
reducing the chance of having to report a breach, since eliminating data
means less exposure to criminals attempting to breach a financial
institution's network.83 To test such protocols, outside security experts
are hired to attempt unauthorized attacks to assess the vulnerability of a
bank's data protection measures.84
Banks also look beyond their own physical perimeters to
scrutinize the data protection measures of third-party marketing
companies that receive data from the banks to assist in selling products
to the customers. 8' The GLBA provides that, in certain circumstances,
if information is going to be shared with non-affiliates of the financial
institution, the customer must be notified of this sharing and given an
opportunity to "opt out. ' 86 As a result, nine of the top fifteen U.S banks
have adopted privacy policies that prohibit sharing customer
information with third-parties, and thus do not have to provide the "opt
out" procedure. 87 This is important because often third-parties are less
careful about protecting confidential information than the financial
institution.88 For instance, in June 2005 hackers stole forty-million
MasterCard and Visa accounts from CardSystems Solutions Inc., a
82. Id.
83. See Michele Heller & Isabelle Lindenmayer, Call to Make Stolen Data Less Usable,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 1, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 12344688.
84. See Grebb, supra note 27.
85. Id.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b) (2000).
87. de Paula, supra note 58. There is still an exception, however, that allows even
institutions that have adopted a privacy policy that prohibits sharing of customer
information (and therefore have no "opt out" procedure in place) to give out customer
information to nonaffiliated third parties "to perform services for" the financial institution or
to jointly market products to the institution's customers. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2). The
GLBA does, however, provide limits on the reuse of such information and on sharing
account numbers for marketing information. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(c) & (d). Additionally, there
does have to be disclosure of the joint marketing exception in the company's privacy notice.
15 U.S.C. § 6803; see also discussion infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
88. Rothfeder, supra note 59. For the third time in 2005, Bank of America reported
losing confidential customer information, when a laptop containing information was stolen
from a third-party "service provider" on August 29, 2005. See Martin H. Bosworth, Bank of




third-party that processed credit transactions between merchants and
banks.8 9
Despite the above, studies on the security initiatives of financial
institutions continue to show that training and awareness of employees
falls well behind technical solutions and compliance for methods of
combating data security breaches. 90 While some banks do realize the
importance that humans play in data security, others must accept the
fact that even though human capital may be more costly than automated
machines, to ignore the human component of security will result in a
greater expense to both the consumer and bank in the long run.91
C. Consumer Education
Yet another aspect that is critical to the success of a bank's
security program is educating consumers about the actual risks of
identity theft, especially in the online environment. 92 Most identity theft
occurs offline from the interception of paper documents, although the
perception among consumers is that online transactions pose a greater
risk of identity theft.93 Banks should counteract these misconceptions
so they will not lose online banking customers and profits, as face to
face human interaction is far more expensive than automated computer
transactions. 94 "For example, a bill sent electronically costs about half
of what a bill costs when sent through regular mail." 95
89. Rothfeder, supra note 59. Visa and Mastercard both require companies they deal
with to encrypt data transmissions, but CardSystems ignored the rule, something that is not
uncommon. Id.
90. See Ciaran Buckley, Internal Security Attacks Affecting Banks, ELECTRICNEwS.NET,
June 22, 2005, http://www.electricnews.net/news.html?code=9614655.
91. See Grebb, supra note 27.
92. Nowadays, when people think of identity theft, they usually think of computers.
See Davenport, supra note 76. However, a January 2005 study conducted by Javelin
Strategy and Research found that in known identity theft cases, the information was
obtained online in only 11.6% of the cases. Id.
93. Id.
94. Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Survey Shows Frequent Data Security Lapses and
Increased Cyber Attacks Damage Consumer Trust in Online Commerce (June 23, 2005),
available at http://www.gartner.com/press-releases/asset_129754_11 .html.
95. Id. Studies show the misconception is taking hold. A Gartner survey of 5,000 U.S.
adults found that seventy-three percent regularly logged on to banking accounts and sixty-
three percent paid bills online. Id. However, thirty percent of those that bank online
reported that recent data attacks have influenced their online banking activities, with over
three-quarters of this group logging on less frequently, and nearly fourteen percent ceasing
online bill payment altogether. Id. This decline in consumer online banking shows a failure
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Consumers should be aware that banks do not call or email
customers and ask them for their personal information. And to
encourage online account use, banks should better promote the fact that
they do not hold customers liable for any unauthorized use of the
customer's account.97  For instance, both Bank of America and
Wachovia guarantee full reimbursement for any unauthorized activity if
notified within sixty days of the date the unauthorized activity shows up
on a customer's bank statement.98 Furthermore, studies show that those
who bank online are able to catch unauthorized activity quicker, thus
leading to less financial harm than those who bank by traditional
methods. 99 If consumers were aware that identity theft is less likely to
occur online than offline, and that they would not be liable for
unauthorized access to their online accounts, both the bank and
customer would benefit. l00 Banks also need to highlight new security
features, such as dual authentication, and convince customers that any
inconvenience presented by the new technology is offset by the greater
protection provided.'0 1 From a marketing perspective, a bank can use
of banks to educate consumers that online banking is more secure than traditional paper
methods. Daniel Wolfe, Fear of Data Theft Hurting Site Traffic, Surveys Find, AM.
BANKER, June 28, 2005, at 9, available at 2005 WLNR 10436975.
96. Isabelle Lindenmayer, Data Breaches Remaking Organizations, Processes, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 27, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 15943452. According to a report
by Javelin Strategy and Research, Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., E-Trade Bank,
Washington Mutual Inc., and Wells Fargo & Co. are the top five banking companies in
regards to protecting and educating their online customers about identity fraud. Isabelle
Lindenmayer, Security Watch, AM. BANKER, Jan. 6, 2006, at 5, available at 2006 WLNR
671797.
97. See Isabelle Lindenmayer, Data Breaches Remaking Organizations, Processes, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 27, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 15943452.
98. Bank of Am. Corp., http://www.bankofamerica.com/onlinebanking/index.cfm?
template=security (last visited Jan. 12, 2006) (discussing the bank's "$0 Liability
Guarantee"); Wachovia Corp., www.wachovia.com/customerprotection/O,,7650_7657,00.
htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2006) (discussing the bank's "Online Services Guarantee"). The
sixty day time-frame is even longer than provided by law for forged or stolen checks
pursuant to U.C.C. § 4-406 (amended 2002) and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-4-406 (2005), which
allow the customer an amount of time not exceeding thirty days after receiving a statement
to report unauthorized activity.
99. See Holly Sraeel, Tackling ID Theft: Will the Real Jane Doe Stand Up?, US
BANKER, Mar. 1, 2005, at 8, available at 2005 WLNR 3098725.
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., Larry Ponemon, Trust in Online Banking: Hard to Earn, Easy to Lose,
COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 26, 2005, http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security
/story/0,10801,101341,00.html (noting that more than seventy-one percent of the
respondents to the 2005 Privacy Trust Survey for Online Banking conducted by Ponemon
Institute cited convenience as their top reason for banking online). While new security
such security to show how much it values privacy and possibly gain
market share along with customer trust.1
0 2
While recent breaches are creating some misconceptions about
the security of online banking, at least they are helping to educate the
public. 10 3 This education by default should shed light on areas where
banks have no control, such as how important it is for consumers to
have virus software and firewalls installed on their personal
computers. 10 4  In turn, the potential for online fraud will decrease as
both banks and personal computer systems become more secure.'0 5
Ensuring 100% data security is an ideal financial institutions can only
strive for, but those that integrate technology, human resources, and
consumer education will be in the best position to avoid costly
breaches. 1
0 6
III. FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION REGULATING SECURITY BREACH
NOTIFICATION
Even with the best security measures, data breaches still can
occur.'0 7 Thus, banks should also devote resources towards developing
a breach notification policy that complies with applicable laws and
regulations, and is as customer-friendly as possible.'0 8
features are more secure, they are also more cumbersome (albeit only marginally so) to
maneuver than traditional security methods, such as single authentication. See Wolfe, supra
note 24.
102. See, e.g., John Engen, Intelligence Turned Inward, FIN. IT SECURITY, Sept. 2005, at
18.
103. See Holly Sraeel, Secure Times? Define Secure., FIN. IT SECURITY, Sept. 2005, at
6.
104. See Wolfe, supra note 24.
105. Id.
106. See Marks, supra note 26.
107. See Hearing on Protecting our Nation's Cyberspace Before the Subcomm. On
Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovermental Relations, and the Census of the H. Comm. on Gov 't
Reform, 109th Cong. 5 (2004) (statement of the Fed. Trade Comm'n), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2004/04/042104cybersecuritytestimony.pdf.
108. See Data Breaches Bad for Business, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Sept. 27, 2005,
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/data-breaches-business.html (explaining
that companies need to clearly communicate what effect the security breach will have on
customers' personal information, and those that do not are four times more likely to
experience customer turnover as a result). See generally Tracy Mayor, Breach Brigade:
When Bad Things Happen to Your Enterprise, You '11 Need a Team and a Process in Place
to Help You Survive the Hot Glare of Media Scrutiny, CSO MAGAZINE, Feb. 2004,
http://www.csoonline.com/read/020104/response.html?action=print.
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A. Federal Data Security for Financial Institutions: Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act
The purpose of the GLBA'0 9 was to reform and modernize the
banking industry by creating financial entities authorized to conduct
various financial activities within the same holding company, including
banking, securities brokering, and insurance, and to control how
financial institutions handled the nonpublic personal information of
customers. 1 0 Title V of the GLBA states that "each financial institution
has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its
customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those
customers' nonpublic personal information.""' To promote this
obligation, the GLBA directed the agencies responsible for enforcement
of the GLBA to establish appropriate standards and rules for financial
institutions to adhere to.112
The federal banking regulatory agencies and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) implemented comparable regulations for entities
under their jurisdictions, including the Interagency Guidelines
Establishing Information Security Standards" 3 (Security Guidelines)
109. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (2000), available at http://www.steptoe.com/publications
/PI6434.pdf.
110. See, e.g., 67 Fed. Reg. 36,484 (May 23, 2002), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/05/67fr36585.pdf (discussing the history of the GLBA in
'preamble Section A: Background'). Under the GLBA, a "financial institution" is defined
as an entity that engages in one or more of the specific activities listed in the Bank Holding
Company Act and its implementing regulations. See 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3). These activities
include traditional banking, extending credit, brokering loans, financial advising, and credit
reporting. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (2000).
111. 15U.S.C.§6801(a).
112. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801(b), 6805(b)(2). The agencies responsible for establishing
the standards were: The National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Board), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS), the Secretary of the Treasury (Treasury), the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). See 15 U.S.C. § 6804. The purpose of
the standards was "to insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and
information, to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity
of such records, and to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or
information which would result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer." 15
U.S.C. § 6801(b)(1)-(3).
113. 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, App. B (2005) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, App. D-2 and pt. 225,
App. F (Board); 12 C.F.R. pt. 364, App. B (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. pt. 570, App. B (OTS). For a
copy of the Federal Register Notice that contains the final Security Guidelines, see
http://www.steptoe.com/publications/PI9188.pdf.
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and Safeguards Rule," 4 respectively. The standards stipulate that
financial institutions must design and implement written security
programs to protect the nonpublic personal information of customers.'
5
A key aspect of the regulations is flexibility, which allows institutions
to decide how best to protect customer information within a certain
outlined framework." 6 At the end of 2004, the federal banking agencies
amended the Security Guidelines to include requiring financial
institutions to develop appropriate measures to dispose of consumer
information derived from consumer reports, implementing section 216
of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 200317 (FACT
Act).118
In addition, financial institutions are prohibited by the GLBA
from disclosing nonpublic personal information to non-affiliated third
parties without first providing consumers with notice and the
opportunity to opt out of such disclosure. 19 The GLBA provides,
however, "a number of statutory exceptions under which disclosure is
permitted without specific notice to the consumer... includ[ing]
consumer reporting (pursuant to the FCRA), fraud prevention, law
enforcement and regulatory or self-regulatory purposes, compliance
114. 16 C.F.R. pt. 314 (2005). For a copy of the Federal Register Notice that contains
the final Safeguards Rule, see http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/O5/67fr36585.pdf. The Securities
and Exchange Commission also adopted a final safeguards rule as part of its Privacy of
Consumer Financial Information Final Rule. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 248 (2005).
115. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, App. B. To the extent that a data broker falls within the
definition of "financial institution" under the GLBA, it must maintain such security
measures for customer information. See FTC ChoicePoint Testimony, supra note 15, at 14.
116. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM'N, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CUSTOMER DATA:
COMPLYING WITH THE SAFEGUARDS RULE (2002), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline
/pubs/buspubs/safeguards.pdf (explaining how regulated entities can comply with the
Safeguards Rule).
117. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681w (2005). Section 216 of the FACT Act is designed to protect
consumers against the risks associated with identity theft and fraud. Letter from Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. to FDIC-Supervised Banks (Commercial and Savings) (Feb. 2, 2005),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fil7O5.pdf.
118. See 69 Fed. Reg. 77,610 (Dec. 28, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R pt. 30, App. B
(OCC); 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, App. D-2 and pt. 225, App. F (Board); 12 C.F.R. pt. 364, App. B
(FDIC); 12 C.F.R. pt. 570, App. B (OTS)), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations
/laws/federal/04jointfact.pdf. The amended Security Guidelines took effect July 1, 2005.
Id.
119. FTC ChoicePoint Testimony, supra note 15, at 11; 15 U.S.C. § 6802; see also
BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROT. DIv. OF FIN. PRACTICES, FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE GRAMM-
LEACH-BLILEY ACT PRIVACY OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL INFORMATION, http://www.ftc.gov
/privacy/glbact/glboutline.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2006) (explaining the privacy provisions
of the GLBA).
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with judicial process, and public safety investigations."120 "Entities that
receive information under ... [a GLBA exception] are subject to...
reuse and redisclosure restrictions ... even if those entities are not
themselves financial institutions."'121
Service providers of financial institutions are not specifically
monitored by the agencies responsible for enforcing the GLBA. 122
However, the agencies direct financial institutions to oversee their
service providers by taking appropriate steps to ensure the service
providers are capable of protecting customer information and by
requiring the service providers, by contract, to implement and maintain
safeguards that satisfy the objectives of the GLBA. 123
While the GLBA addresses financial institutions' duties to
protect customer information, the Act contained no specific mandates
concerning a duty to notify customers whose nonpublic personal
information was compromised.12 4 Nor did the standards implemented
by the agencies directly address the issue.2 5  And while the GLBA
preempts state laws that are inconsistent with its provisions, state
legislation that provides greater protection than the GLBA is not
considered to be inconsistent. 2 6 This opened the door for states to pass
their own breach notification laws, such as was done in California. 127
120. FTC ChoicePoint Testimony, supra note 15, at 11 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e)).
121. FTC ChoicePoint Testimony, supra note 15, at 11 (citing 16 C.F.R. § 313.11(a)).
Data brokers may receive some of their information from credit reporting agencies, such as
credit header data that includes a consumers name, address, and social security number.
FTC ChoicePoint Testimony, supra note 15, at 12. "Because credit header data is typically
derived from information originally provided by financial institutions, data brokers who
receive this information are limited by the GLBA's reuse and redisclosure provision." Id.
122. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, App. B (2005).
123. Id. Even though monitoring service providers is the primary responsibility of the
financial institution, regulators do have authority to examine them. See Michele Heller,
Agencies: No New Bank-Data Laws, AM. BANKER, May 19, 2005, at 4, available at 2005
WLNR 8288917; see also Damian Paletta & Michele Heller, Lenders Demand Closer
Scruitiny of Data Processors, AM. BANKER, June 24, 2005, at 3, available at 2005 WLNR
10306989 (calling for regulators to better scrutinize the third-party processors that banks
use).
124. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (2000).
125. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, App. B (2005).
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 6807.




B. State Breach Notification Legislation
On July 1, 2003, California Senate Bill 1386 (SB 1386) became
the first breach notification law in the country.128 California's law
applies to any person or business that conducts business in California
and that owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal
information. 129 As defined by the California law:
"personal information" means an individual's first name
or first initial and last name in combination with any one
or more of the following data elements, when either the
name or data elements are not encrypted: (1) Social
Security number. (2) Driver's license number or
California Identification Card number. (3) Account
number, credit or debit card number, in combination
with any required security code, access code, or
password that would permit access to an individual's
financial account.
130
"Personal Information" does not include publicly available information,
such as government records.
1 3
'
The California law calls for disclosure of any breach of the
unencrypted personal information of any resident of California whose
unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have
been, acquired by an unauthorized person. 3 2 Notice of the breach has
128. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.82. For a more in depth discussion of the history of
California SB 1386, see generally Timothy H. Skinner, California's Database Breach
Notification Secuirty Act: The First State Notification Law is Not Yet a Suitable Template
for National Identity Theft Legislation, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12-19 (2003).
129. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. Under guidance issued by the California Office of Privacy Protection, a variety
of factors can be considered in determining whether information has been "acquired,"
including (1) indications that protected data is in the physical possession and control of an
unauthorized person (such as a lost or stolen computer or other device); (2) indications that
protected data has been downloaded or copied; or (3) indications that protected data has
been used by an unauthorized person, such as to open new accounts. CAL. OFFICE OF
PRIVACY PROT., CAL. DEP'T OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES ON
NOTIFICATION OF SECURITY BREACH INVOLVING PERSONAL INFORMATION 11 (2003),
available at http://www.privacy.ca.gov/recommendations/secbreach.pdf.
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to be made without unreasonable delay in the most expedient way, but
may be withheld if the notice would impede a criminal investigation or
if measures are necessary to restore the integrity of the data system
before the breach is made public.133 Acceptable methods of providing
the notice include written notice and electronic notice. 34 However, if
the cost of providing the notice exceeds $250,000 or the number of
people to be notified exceeds 500,000, substitute notice consisting of
email, a posting on the businesses' website, and notification of major
statewide media will suffice.'35
California's law has been credited as the reason companies that
suffered security breaches in 2005 notified affected customers, thus
propelling the issue into the national spotlight.' 36 In fact, data brokers
admitted in testimony before Congress that prior to SB 1386, they
simply did not inform consumers of breaches and the resulting
possibility of identity theft. 137 But with the onslaught of attention being
given to disclosures of data breaches pursuant to SB 1386 in 2005, other
states began to take action. t38 Through the first seven months of 2005,
thirty-five states had breach notification legislation pending, and as of
December 2005, breach notification legislation had been enacted in
twenty-two states. 139  Effective dates ranged from March 21, 2005
(Arkansas),'140 to July 1, 2006 (Indiana).' 41
133. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Pacelle, supra note 8. No other state enacted breach notification
legislation during 2004, and California SB 1386 seemed to slip under the radar. See, e.g.,
Searcey, supra note 13.
137. See Senate Vote on Data Brokers Likely This Week, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Sept.
26, 2005, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/senate_data.privacy.html.
138. See, e.g., Searcey, supra note 13. Before any other state could enact breach notice
legislation, state attorney generals forced ChoicePoint and other data compromised
companies to honor California's notice requirements nationwide. See, e.g., 2005 Breach ofInformation Legislation, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/programs
/lis/CIP/priv/breach.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2006) (describing how, at first, ChoicePoint
only notified California residents of the breach).
139. See GAIL HILLEBRAND, CONSUMERS UNION U.S., INC., NOTICE OF SECURITY BREACH
STATE LAWS, http://www.consumersunion.org/campaigns/financialprivacynow/leam.html
(last visited Jan. 12, 2006) (follow "States with Notice of Security Breach Laws" hyperlink)(summarizing state breach laws enacted as of Nov. 30, 2005). For a brief comparison of
how each state's breach notification law compares to CA SB 1386, seehttp://www.perkinscoie.com/content/ren/updates/privacy/O10306.htm (last visited Jan. 12,
2006); see also 2005 Breach of Information Legislation, supra note 138.
140. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (2005), available at http://www.arkleg.state.ar.
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While these new state laws generally follow the California
framework, there are differences. Some states, such as Louisiana and
Arkansas, allow for a risk assessment analysis, and will not require
notice if after an investigation it is determined that there is "no
reasonable likelihood" of harm to customers. 41 Others apply to a
narrower grouping of entities than California's, such as Indiana's, which
only applies to government agencies.14 3 However, some cover more
ground than SB 1386, such as New York's and North Carolina's (NC),
which direct notification for both unencrypted and encrypted personal
information, if the encryption key is also breached.1 44 A corollary to the
NC law is that financial institutions subject to and in compliance with
the Federal Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for
Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer 
Notice1 45
are deemed to be in compliance with NC's law. 146 Illinois' law, unlike
California's and most other states, will allow no delay in telling
consumers about a breach even when such notice may impede a
criminal investigation. 47  Various state breach notification laws also
call for civil and criminal penalties if notice is not timely, and also for
recovery of damages by individuals in a civil action against businesses
in violation of the disclosure requirements. 48 In addition to data breach
notification, several of the state laws address other related issues, such
as NC's, which gives consumers the right to freeze their credit reports
us/ftproot/bills/2005/public/SB 1167.pdf.
141. IND. CODE ANN. § 4-1-11-1 (West 2005), available at http://www.in.gov/legislative
/ic/code/title4/ar 1/ch 11.pdf.
142. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:3074.G (2005), available at http://www.legis.state.1a.us/
billdata/streamdocument.asp?did= 3 20 0 93 ; ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105(d).
143. IND. CODE ANN. § 4-1-11-5 (West 2005).
144. N.Y GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa.l(b) (McKinney 2005), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A0 4 2 54 &sh-t; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-61(14) (2005),
available at http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2005/Bills/Senate/PDF/S 1048v6.pdf.
145. 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736 (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R pt. 30, Supplement
A to App. B (OCC); 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, Supplement A to App. D-2 and pt. 225, Supplement
A to App. F (Board); 12 C.F.R. pt. 364, Supplement A to App. B (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. pt. 570,
Supplement A to App. B (OTS)), available at http://www.steptoe.com/publications
/P19187.pdf; see also discussion infra part III.C.
146. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65(h). Various other states exempt financial institutions
in compliance with the Guidance as well. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:3076.




148. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2005) (timely); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:3075
(2005) (recover damages).
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and restricts the use of social security numbers. 4 9 While the differences
are mostly minor as compared to California's law, the implications of
having to comply with fifty different state laws could be huge for
financial institutions, especially ones operating in multiple states (this
would include nationally chartered or state chartered banks).l5 0
C. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs Guidelines
Presumably as a result of the onslaught of security breaches
being disclosed to the public as a result of California's breach
notification bill, the federal banking agencies issued the Interagency
Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice (Guidance) 5' to clarify the
responsibilities of financial institutions in dealing with breach
notification. The Guidance, which became effective on March 29,
2005, is an interpretation of both section 501(b) of the GLBA and the
Security Guidelines adopted by the agencies at the direction of the
GLBA. 152  The Guidance provides specific mandates for financial
149. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-62 to 63. For a summary of states with security freeze
legislation, see http://www.pirg.org/consumer/credit/statelaws.htm (last visited Jan. 12,
2006).
150. See, e.g., Mitchell Pacelle and Christopher Conkey, Card Issuers Take Swipe at
Rules. Federal, State Legislators Propose Bills on Reporting Data Thefts; Financial Firms
Want Control, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2005, at C 1.
151. 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736 (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R pt. 30, Supplement
A to App. B (2005) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. pt. 208, Supplement A to App. D-2 and pt. 225,
Supplement A to App. F (Board); 12 C.F.R. pt. 364, Supplement A to App. B (FDIC); 12
C.F.R. pt. 570, Supplement A to App. B (OTS)), available at http://www.steptoe.com
/publications/PI9187.pdf. Federal bank and thrift regulators released a compliance guide in
December 2005 summarizing existing rules on safeguarding customer data, including the
Guidance, to assist financial institutions. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards Small-Entity
Compliance Guide (Dec. 14, 2005) available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press
/2005/pr 12705a.html.
152. See 70 Fed. Reg. at 15,736. The Guidance became effective immediately instead of
being phased in because the agencies contended that the Guidance was nothing more than an
elaboration of preexisting requirements. Id. at 15,748. In fact, the agencies published a
'proposed Guidance' in the Federal Register on August 12, 2003, which noted that financial
institutions' information security programs were expected to include a breach response
program. Id. at 15,737. For a copy of the Federal Register Notice containing the proposed
Guidance, see http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/7/73195.pdf. Due to the immediate effective
date of the final Guidance, "when evaluating the adequacy of a national bank's information
security program," the agencies "will take into account the good faith efforts made by each
bank to develop a response program that is consistent with the guidance, together with all
other relevant circumstances." OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL.
institutions on notification to customers whose sensitive information is
breached.'53
The Guidance, like the Security Guidelines, allows financial
institutions flexibility in designing a response program tailored to the
institutions' business as long as certain minimum guidelines 
are met.15 4
These minimum guidelines include: assessing the nature and scope of
an incident, and identifying what customer information systems and
types of customer information have been accessed or misused; notifying
the institution's primary federal regulator as soon as possible when the
institution becomes aware of an incident involving unauthorized access
to or use of sensitive customer information; notifying appropriate law
enforcement authorities consistent with suspicious activity report
regulations; taking appropriate steps to contain and control the incident
to prevent further unauthorized access to or use of customer
information, for example, by monitoring, freezing, or closing affected
accounts, while preserving records and other evidence; and notifying
customers when warranted.'55
In addition, the Guidance mandates that the standard for
providing notice for incidents of "unauthorized access to sensitive
customer information" is when the information has been or is
reasonably likely to be misused.'56
Sensitive customer information is defined to mean:
a customer's name, address, or telephone number, in
conjunction with the customer's social security number,
driver's license number, account number, credit or debit
card number, or a personal identification number or
password that would permit access to the customer's
account. Sensitive customer information also includes
any combination of components of customer
information that would allow someone to log onto or
No. 2005-13, RESPONSE PROGRAMS FOR UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO CUSTOMER
INFORMATION AND CUSTOMER NOTICE: FINAL GUIDANCE (2005), available at
http://www.occ.gov/ftp/bulletin/ 2 00 5-13.doc.
153. 70 Fed. Reg. at 15,751.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 15,752.
156. Id. at 15,736.
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access the customer's account, such as user name and
password or password and account number.'57
The notice should be given in a "clear and conspicuous manner" and
delivered "in any manner designed to ensure that a customer can
reasonably be expected to receive it."' 58 Similar to most state breach
notification laws, notice can be delayed if a law enforcement agency
determines it will interfere with a criminal investigation.' 59
However, there is no exception for encrypted information like in
California's breach notification law. 60 Dealing with service providers,
the Guidance states that a financial institution's contracts with its
service providers should mandate the service providers take appropriate
measures to address incidents of unauthorized access to the financial
institution's customer information.' 6' This includes notification to the
institution as soon as possible to allow implementation of the
institution's response program. 6  Thus, as with the Security
Guidelines, monitoring service providers is left primarily to the
financial institutions. 63
It is important to note that as an interpretation of the GLBA, the
Guidance only preempts state laws that are inconsistent with the GLBA,
and as previously mentioned, state laws are not inconsistent if they offer
more protection than the GLBA. 64 Arguably, the Guidance sets forth
the broadest data breach coverage to date, as it does not contain a
blanket exemption for encrypted information breaches and applies on a
national level to financial institutions. 65  Some critics have argued,
however, that by granting financial institutions more flexibility in
deciding whether to report a breach, it is less desirable than legislation
like SB 1386, which forgoes any type of risk assessment analysis and
157. Id.
158. Id. at 15,752-53.
159. 70 Fed. Reg. at 15,752.
160. Id. at 15,745.
161. Id. at 15,752.
162. Id. The Guidance allows a financial institution to authorize or contract with its
service provider to notify the institution's customers or regulator on its behalf. Id.
163. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
164. 70 Fed. Reg. at 15,738. Bank regulators expressly refused to preempt state data
breach notification laws with the Guidance. Id.




mandates reporting any breach when a consumer's unencrypted
personal information is acquired.'66
IV. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO RECENT BREACHES
With the onslaught of media attention being given to data
security breaches in 2005, and with as many as 50 million constituents
whose personal information had been compromised due to the breaches,
congressional action was inevitable. 167 Twenty bills on data breaches or
identity theft were pending in Congress during June alone. 168  By
October 2005, six congressional committees were considering
legislation to establish national standards on data security. 169 At first,
financial institutions, as well as other businesses, were adamantly
opposed to any federal mandates in the area. 7 ° But as word of more
breaches spread, and as states started to enact inconsistent breach
disclosure legislation setting up a patchwork regulatory scheme for the
institutions to follow, sentiment turned towards favoring federal
preemptive legislation.' 7 ' While many of the bills introduced share
strong bipartisan support, there are still many challenges to enactment
of a federal breach disclosure law.
17 2
Almost every proposed federal bill addresses the self-regulated
nature of the data broker industry and the need for change.'73
Additionally, any national data protection law will deal with the
following issues: preemption, exemptions, scope of data protection
programs, notice triggers, and penalties. 7 4 What remains to be seen is
who will win the debate on what shape and form these factors should
possess, with industries supporting basic notification standards that
166. See, e.g., Hannah Bergman, Federal Bills Could Weaken Data Security, Activists
Say, AM. BANKER, Mar. 30, 2005, at 2, available at 2005 WLNR 5312072.
167. See, e.g., Pacelle & Conkey, supra note 150.
168. See, e.g., id.
169. See, e.g., Michele Heller, Debate Starts on Legislative Response, AM. BANKER, Oct.




173. See, e.g., Testimony of Consumer and Privacy Groups, supra note 10, at 8.
174. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 169.
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allow for discretion and consumer advocates supporting stricter
standards that contain no risk analysis.'75
A. Preemption
A federal law that preempts the inconsistent patchwork of state
laws in the area of breach disclosure is critical to financial
institutions. 7 6  State and consumer advocates, however, have lobbied
against such preemption.'77 The federal proposals call for differing
levels of preemption. Some bills would totally preempt state laws that
cover data security, breach notification, identity theft, and other
consumer-privacy issues."' Other bills, however, while preempting
state privacy laws in the areas of data security and breach disclosure,
would allow states to continue to legislate in other areas of data
protection as long as the state laws were not inconsistent with the
federal law, in a manner similar to the GLBA.
79
The benefit to financial institutions of a federal bill that totally
preempts state laws in the area of monitoring security programs and
breach disclosures is clear - not having to comply with fifty different
state laws. 80 This would save both time - as only one uniform standard
will need to be consulted - and money, as complying with one law is
cheaper than having to comply with fifty.' 8' As businesses pass costs
onto consumers, this in turn should provide consumers with cheaper
175. See, e.g., Pacelle & Conkey, supra note 150.
176. See, e.g., Bank Lawyer's Blog, http://www.banklawyersblog.com/ (Aug. 11, 2005,
5:33 PM). Though a preemption rule the OCC issued in January 2005 has shielded national
banks from many state privacy laws, the OCC has not said whether it applies to state data
security and breach notification laws. Michele Heller, In Focus: Federal Effort Stalled,
Firms Prep for State Laws on Data, AM. BANKER ONLINE, Nov. 21, 2005 (subscription
required; on file with author). Parties on both sides of the issue agree that the comptroller
may have the ability to preempt such state privacy protections, and all that is needed is the
right case to prove it in court. Ethan Zindler, Preemption Issue May Turn on Conflict in 2
Federal Laws, AM. BANKER, Dec. 19, 2005, at 4, available at 2005 WLNR 20863891.
177. See, e.g., Pacelle & Conkey, supra note 150.
178. See Heller, supra note 176.
179. Id. This view supports that any federal law should be a floor that state legislatures
can raise with their own laws, instead of a ceiling that prevents further state legislation,
similar to the GLBA's treatment of privacy protection. See, e.g., Testimony of Consumer
and Privacy Groups, supra note 10, at 4.
180. See, e.g., Bank Lawyer's Blog, supra note 176.
181. Id.
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services.112  However, a law that only partially preempts state laws
could create a burdensome and inconsistent regulatory framework,
especially if the remaining states enact their own data security laws
containing unique features, such as credit freezes. 83  Moreover,
customers in different states would receive different levels of
protection. 114  Finally, if compliance becomes too costly, financial
institutions may stop offering certain services, an outcome that should
be avoided.' 85
B. Exemption
What entities are exempted from any federal disclosure law is
another important question for financial institutions. 186  Financial
institutions already regulated in this area by the GLBA security and
notification requirements have made a strong case that they should be
exempt from any additional federal law in this area.'87 All of the federal
proposals contain an exemption from any data protection measures for
GLBA-covered entities, as the GLBA already requires such data
safeguards. 88  And some of the federal proposals provide a breach
notification exemption for GLBA covered entities. 18 9  Under such a
proposal, financial institutions would thus be subject to the GLBA's
data protection standards along with the data breach notification
requirements of the Guidance.' 90 Proponents of an exemption of GLBA
182. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 169.
183. Id. While a uniform standard for notice would be a positive step, a federal bill that
also allows for different and tougher state privacy laws in other areas of data security is hard
to justify from the perspective of financial institutions. Id. However, legislators may see
this as the only way to get a bill passed without creating an uproar from consumer friendly
groups. Id.
184. Id. The more likely scenario, however, is that banks would follow the strictest
standards of the various state laws, thus giving consumers the same level of protection -
although likely offering more protection than any one state contemplated. Heller, supra
note 176.
185. See Searcey, supra note 13.
186. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 169.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., Kirk J. Nahra, Federal Security Breach Legislation Progresses (but
Slowly), PRIVACY TN Focus, (Wiley Rein & Feilding LLP, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 2005, at 4,
available at http://www.wrf.com/docs/newsletter issues/394.pdf.
189. See Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1408, 109th Cong. § 5(g) (2005), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/s 1408.pdf.
190. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 169.
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covered institutions from any new federal law's notification
requirement point to the fact that the Guidance is a fair disclosure law
and all that is needed to prove that fact is time.19' As previously
discussed, opponents argue that such a proposal gives financial
institutions too much discretion, and the Guidance is a weaker
regulatory scheme than the current superior state law framework.
9 2
If not exempted from federal breach disclosure legislation,
financial institutions could be in a position of having to comply with
dual compliance obligations, subject to state oversight along with
GLBA regulator oversight. 93 While some in the industry claim this to
be an "untenable position," having to comply with one national standard
and the GLBA seems a more manageable framework than compliance
with fifty state laws and the GLBA. 94 And being that data breach
disclosures by financial institutions are now addressed by the Guidance
- which is not law nor regulation - it is likely that the Guidance could be
easily modified or eliminated in response to a federal data breach
disclosure bill to alleviate any burden of dual compliance.' 95 Yet breach
disclosure is just one aspect of the federal proposals, and other issues
not addressed by the GLBA, such as civil penalties for violations of
security standards, would create additional burdens not present to
financial institutions under only GLBA regulation. 196
Another possible aspect of exemption is that certain types of
breached data could be excluded from the notification requirement, such
as encrypted files.' 97 Opponents of this approach argue that encrypted
files should not be exempted due to weaknesses in encryption
technologies. 198 Yet an exemption on data that is encrypted, as long as
the encryption codes are not also compromised, would no doubt
strongly encourage all regulated entities to adopt encryption
191. See, e.g., Eugene A. Ludwig, Don't Let Security Fears Stifle Innovation, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 23, 2005, at 10, available at 2005 WLNR 15364229.
192. See, e.g., Testimony of Consumer and Privacy Groups, supra note 10, at 8.
193. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 169.
194. Id.
195. See Rob Garver, Is it Time to Start Issuing Guidelines on the Guidelines?, AM.
BANKER, May 3, 2005, at 6A, available at 2005 WLNR 7276418.
196. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 169.
197. See Testimony of Consumer and Privacy Groups, supra note 10, at 8.
198. Id.; see also supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
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technologies and facilitate technological advances in the field to reduce
liability in case of a data breach.' 99
C. Scope of Data Security Programs
While financial institutions may be exempted from coverage of
a federal data security bill, data brokers will not.20 0  Early federal
proposals were focused almost entirely on the data broker industry.0°
More recent proposals, however, apply to all businesses that maintain
sensitive personal consumer data.20 2 Still, a focal point of each
proposed bill is to require written security programs for data brokers.20 3
Because financial institutions are already required by the GLBA to
maintain data protection programs, and all the proposed bills mirror the
GLBA requirements, any federal mandate in this area will not impose
any additional burdens on financial institutions.
2 4
However, the effect of such legislation will have a huge impact
on the financial industry. This is because by creating a national
standard for non-financial institutions to adhere to, the security of
sensitive customer personal information across all industries will be
brought up to the level that exists in the financial services industry, a
much needed improvement over the current regulatory scheme.20 5
Another possible benefit to financial institutions is if third-party
service providers are regulated along with data brokers, which will be
the case if the bill covers all entities that maintain sensitive consumer
information, as most proposals do.20 6  "If vendors are mandated by
federal law to meet essentially the same data protection and [breach
notification] standards as... bank[s] ... , this would remove... the
bargaining power" some vendors hold over less sophisticated and
199. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 68.
200. See, e.g., Christopher Conkey, Identity-Theft Bills Stall in Congress, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 26, 2005, at A4.
201. See, e.g., Nahra, supra note 188.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.; see also supra notes 109-27 and accompanying text.
205. See Ludwig, supra note 191.
206. See Testimony of Consumer and Privacy Groups, supra note 10, at 3 (calling for the
extension of the GLBA's Safeguards rule to third party processors); see also Michele Heller,
Postponing Battle, Panel OKs Data Bill, AM. BANKER ONLINE, Nov. 18, 2005 (subscription
required; on file with author).
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smaller banks to negotiate less than full compliance with GLBA
standards. 207  Additionally, third-party service providers will be held
accountable and monitored for compliance on a continuous basis by
federal regulators, instead of solely by banks overseeing their contracts
with the vendors per the GLBA.20 ' This shift of liability can only help
banks whose images have taken a hit due to the loss of data by third-
parties.20 9 It may also help shift financial liability, as banks are
currently left to sue service providers who allow customer data to be
accessed by unauthorized individuals in order to gain restitution. 210 A
financial institution would still, however, likely take a reputation hit for
selecting a third-party who was subject to a data breach.211
D. Notice Triggers
The most debated aspect of the federal bills, outside of federal
preemption, is when a breached entity must provide notice to those
whose data was breached.21 2 At least one federal proposal would just
extend the bank security Guidance framework to other businesses.213
Another bill would require notification if the breached information
included a person's name along with any two of the following details:
207. Bank Lawyer's Blog, http://www.banklawyersblog.com/ (Jul. 28, 2005, 7:30 AM).
"Except to the extent that state law imposes ... similar requirement[s] [for data protection,
such as in California,] ... vendors have room to 'maneuver' in the course of contract
negotiations .... " Id. Some vendors use this bargaining power to negotiate less than full
protection for banks in this area, as well as shifting the cost of compliance with the GLBA
onto the bank. Id.
208. Id.; see supra notes 122-23, 161-63 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., Michele Heller, 13 Breach Bills (Only I Tackles Liability Issue), AM.
BANKER, Aug. 5, 2005, at 1, available at 2005 WLNR 12643713. Critics argue that banks
should be held liable for the failures of third parties to protect data. See, e.g., Testimony of
Consumer and Privacy Groups, supra note 10, at 2.
210. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 209. "Service providers generally are not household
names, so when a breach occurs that puts card accounts at risk, the bank that issued the card
has to notify affected customers and reissue the card." Id. Along with shouldering the cost
of notifying the breached cardholders, banks often take a reputation hit as well, as customers
view the bank as the responsible party. Id. Companies argue that notification and replacing
debit and credit cards is expensive, costing as much as $15 per affected customer just to
reissue a card, and those responsible for any data breach should cover such costs. Conkey,
supra note 200.
211. Heller, supra note 209.
212. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 169.
213. Id. Notably, this proposal comes from the House Financial Services Committee. Id.
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address, phone number, or birth date. 214 Additionally, customers would
have to be notified of a breach if it involved their name and an account
access code or password.215  Critics of these farthest reaching
notification measures argue that none of this information is generally
considered sensitive, either alone or when combined together.1 6
Each proposal does, however, provide more leeway than SB
1386 in deciding whether or not to report a breach. 2 7  For example,
even the most far-reaching proposal states that a business can avoid
notification of customers if a risk assessment conducted in consultation
with Federal law enforcement authorities concludes that there is no
significant risk of harm to individuals whose sensitive personally
identifiable information was at issue in the breach. 1 8 Another proposal
sets the notice trigger at a "reasonable risk of identity theft" to one or
more individuals, using a preponderance of the evidence standard to see
if such theft is foreseeable.1 9
If every single breach, no matter what risk of harm involved,
had to be reported, consumers might start ignoring the notices,
especially if the compromised information is never actually used by
thieves.220 On top of this, regulators could possibly feel the same effect,
and not react appropriately when a serious breach occurred.2
Moreover, requiring notification for every breach, no matter how
minimal, could carry with it great expense. This cost would
214. Id.; Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, 109th Cong. § 3
(2005), available at http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/si789.pdf. The Personal
Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005 is co-sponsored by Senators Arlen Specter, Patrick
Leahy, Dianne Feinstein, and Russell Feingold. Id.
215. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 169.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Bergman, supra note 167.
218. See S. 1789.
219. See Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1408, 109th Cong. § 3(c) (2005), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/s1408.pdf.
220. See Searcey, supra note 13.
221. See, e.g., Michael Sisk, Careful What You Wish For, FIN. IT SECURITY, Sept. 2005,
at 11 (describing how when bank regulators demanded more rigorous reporting of
suspicious activity reports (SARs), regulators could not identify the SARs that might
actually be an indicator of wrongdoing because of the volume received).
222. See Hearing on Data Breaches and Identity Theft Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. 10 (2005) [hereinafter FTC June
2005 Testimony] (statement of the Fed. Trade Comm'n), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os
/2005/06/050616databreaches.pdf. For example, a customer may respond to a security
breach notification by canceling credit cards, contacting credit bureaus to place fraud alerts
on their files, or by obtaining a new driver's license. Id. Each of these actions can be time
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ultimately be passed onto the consumer in the shape of less or more
expensive services.223 Adding to this, some fear that onerous notice
requirements will stifle and impede the advances being made in data
protection technology. 224
Notification proponents argue that customers have a right to
know whenever their sensitive information is acquired by an
unauthorized person.225  They contend that breached entities have no
way of knowing how stolen information will be used, and also have a
conflicting interest to not report a breach to avoid reputation harm.226
Moreover, if every breach must be reported, companies will put more
money into data security measures. 227 By this logic, the number of
breaches will be reduced as a result of stronger security encouraged by a
strict notification standard.228
Another factor that could affect how much harm a breach causes
is the timeliness of notice. 9 Prompt notification of data breaches to
customers and law enforcement officials can help mitigate any damage
caused by identity theft or other fraud. 230 Language in proposed bills
ranges from requiring notice "in the most expedient manner practicable,
but not later than 45 days, 23' after discovery of a breach, to "without
unreasonable delay following the discovery of,232 a security breach.
Like SB 1386 and the Guidance, all the proposed federal bills also allow
for a delay of notice if law enforcement determines that such notice
would impede an investigation or if steps are necessary to restore the
integrity of the data system.233
consuming and costly, both for the consumer and business involved. Id.
223. See Searcey, supra note 13.
224. See Michele Heller, Flurry of Action in Congress on Data Security, AM. BANKER,
July 21, 2005, at 6, available at 2005 WLNR 11796382.
225. See, e.g., Testimony of Consumer and Privacy Groups, supra note 10, at 9.
226. Id. at 10.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See FTC June 2005 Testimony, supra note 222, at 10.
230. Id.
231. Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1408, 109th Cong. § 3(e) (2005), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bils.text/I109/s 1408.pdf.
232. Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, 109th Cong. § 32 1(c)
(2005), available at http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bils.text/109/s1789.pdf.
233. See, e.g., S. 1408, § 3(e)(2).
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E. Penalties and Other Issues
The majority of federal proposals also contain some kind of
monetary penalty for failing to report a breach within the specified time
frame. The amounts are significant, ranging from "$1,000 per day per
individual whose sensitive personally identifiable information was, or is
reasonably believed to have been, accessed or acquired" up to $11
million "in the aggregate for all such individuals [related to one
breach].''234 In addition, businesses or individuals that intentionally or
willfully violate the notice requirements could be subject to additional
monetary punishment or up to five years imprisonment.235 Critics argue
that the civil penalties should have a limit, because "'[i]f violations are
not discovered for a long period of time, the uncapped [monetary]
penalties may be excessive... [as compared to the actual harm]
incurred.' ' 236 Most of the proposals do, however, bar individuals from
suing for damages, but some would allow states to bring suits.
237
Various other issues, including giving consumers the right to
correct inaccurate information data brokers hold on them, restricting the
use of social security numbers, and allowing consumers to freeze their
credit reports, could be addressed by a federal data security law. 8
Allowing consumers the right to correct inaccurate information data
brokers hold on them would extend similar requirements already
imposed on credit reporting agencies under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act,239 financial institutions under the GLBA, 240 and health care
providers under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act.
24 1
Dealing with social security numbers, one proposal would bar
businesses from requiring a consumer's social security number "unless
there is a specific use ... for which no other identifier can be
reasonably used. 242 It would also ban the sale, purchase, and display of
234. S. 1789, § 327; S. 1408, § 5(e).
235. See S. 1789, § 102.
236. See Heller, supra note 169.
237. See Heller, supra note 209.
238. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 169.
239. See 15 U.S.C. §1681g (2000).
240. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2000).
241. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320dto 1320d-8 (2000).
242. See Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1408, 109th Cong. § 8 (2005), available at
2006]
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social security numbers to the general public.24 3 Proponents of such a
measure note that restricting the use of social security numbers is
perhaps the core issue of data security - making customer information
less valuable to thieves.244 While data security is important, proponents
note that if criminals could not create value from the data, they would
not try to steal it.245 But businesses oppose such a measure, saying that
"[w]ithout the ability to use Social Security numbers as personal
identifiers and fraud prevention tools, the granting of credit and the
provision of other financial services would become riskier... [,] more
expensive[,] and inconvenient for customers.2 46
Following the states lead, a federal data security bill may also
allow consumers to block access to their credit reports. 47 Such a tool
effectively prevents criminals from opening up new lines of credit under
false identities, as creditors are unlikely to extend credit to those that
they cannot check credit reports or scores on. 248 Financial institutions
contend that the time requirements imposed by such freezes create
unnecessary costs for all consumers, slows down the flow of
information (and therefore business), and that freezing credit reports
should be limited to previous victims of identity theft.249 Proponents
argue that such credit freezes would "prevent identity thieves from
achieving their ultimate goal - opening up new credit accounts to
accumulate debt in the consumer's name" - and should be available for
all consumers.25 ° If modeled after New Jersey's security freeze law,'
http://www.govtrack.us/data/usibills.text/I109/s 1408.pdf.
243. Id. § 8(d). The "Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005" (originally S.
1332) included a proposal to limit the buying and selling of social security numbers, but
was amended to remove such language in order to get more Senate Judiciary Committee
members to support the bill. See Alexei Alexis, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman
Considers Moving Narrow ID Theft Bill, E-COMMERCE LAW DAILY, Sept. 30, 2005,
http://subscript.bna.com/SAMPLES/ecd.nsf/O/cd7Oa8e2679382968525708b007fb 1 c 1 ?Open
Document.
244. See Heller & Lindenmayer, supra note 83.
245. Id.
246. See FTC June 2005 Testimony, supra note 222, at 13. Various policy and practical
concerns are raised by the fact that social security numbers are in the public records of many
cities and counties. Id. at 15.
247. Heller, supra note 176; see also supra note 149 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., Testimony of Consumer and Privacy Groups, supra note 10, at 11-12.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 11.




which is the farthest reaching in the country, a federal credit freeze
provision would allow individuals to freeze their credit reports and
would require credit agencies to allow consumers to instantly unthaw
such a freeze within fifteen minutes of notice to do so.
25 2
V. CONCLUSION
For financial institutions that are already regulated by the
GLBA, any extension of GLBA-like data safeguard standards to the rest
of corporate America means having to worry less about customer data
getting lost or stolen after it gets to third parties. 253 In addition, if a
federal breach disclosure law is enacted that does not exempt financial
institutions already covered by the GLBA and Guidance mandates, the
regulatory landscape for financial institutions will become more
burdensome as states continue to pass their own data security laws.254
Such a regulatory environment could result in companies focusing more
on compliance than security, and stifle the wave of innovations the
industry responded to data security breaches with in 2005.255 As
previously discussed, any federal proposal that preempts the maze of
state breach disclosure laws developing would be a welcome sign for
banks.256 In contrast, a federal bill with inadequate preemption
measures will be of little value to financial institutions.257
Financial institutions also need a specific standard to follow in
terms of when to notify.258 A vague standard could lead to over-
notification in fear of penalties, and would be both expensive and could
numb consumers and regulators alike when a serious data breach
occurs.
2 19 In a best case scenario, a federal bill would limit notification
to data breaches that threaten a "significant risk" of identity theft.26° In
addition, financial institutions would best be served by a federal bill that
252. Testimony of Consumer and Privacy Groups, supra note 10, at 12.
253. See Michael Grebb, Congress Jumps Into Privacy Debate, FIN. IT SECURITY, Sept.
2005, at 15.
254. Heller, supra note 176.
255. See Ludwig, supra note 191.
256. Id.
257. Heller, supra note 206.
258. See, e.g., Conkey, supra note 200.
259. See, e.g., Pacelle & Conkey, supra note 150.
260. See, e.g., Conkey, supra note 200.
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did not empower consumers to freeze their credit reports, as such a
measure would slow down electronic commerce.26'
"Congress will not pass data-security legislation until ... March
[2006] at the earliest - by which time [twenty-one] state laws, many
conflicting, will be in effect. ' '262 Due to the differences between the
state laws, the longer Congress waits, the more difficult compliance will
be.263 The net effect, however, will probably result in financial
institutions following the strictest state standards nationwide and doing
more than any one state contemplated.26
Financial institutions would be wise to learn from the lesson
learned in 2005 - no matter how secure customer information seems,
there is still a good chance a data breach may occur.265 Additionally,
even if the financial institution was not directly responsible for the
breach, it will likely suffer reputation harm if the breach is not handled
swiftly and properly after discovery.26 6 Financial institutions should
thus continue to develop the mindset that security is a total organization
focus, instead of just one department. 267  Those that embrace this
mindset will not only be able to better protect sensitive customer
information, but will also gain a reputation for such with the ever
increasing importance being placed on data protection by consumers. 68
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